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Non-technical Summary
The paper contributes to the analysis of how offshoring has an impact on labor mar-
ket outcomes in terms of labor income. Special attention is given to the link between
offshoring and income risk - an aspect of income volatility that has scarcely received at-
tention in the previous literature. Permanent income risk is defined as variance of shocks
to income that do not fade out over time and are assumed to be not self-insurable. These
so-called permanent income risks are clearly welfare relevant as they affect risk-averse
individual’s decisions on consumption and savings. The aspect of income risk adds to the
literature in an important way. While most studies deal with level effects on income, we
complement the analysis with a look at volatility. Naturally, for risk-averse individuals,
the volatility of the long-term income process is a crucial aspect on top of considerations
regarding the level of their earnings. We are also the first to provide an analysis for
Germany; a large trading economy with exceptional reliance on international integration.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the unpredictable part of individual income
is estimated as the residual term from wage regressions based on individual-level data.
Second, values for permanent income risk at the sector level are estimated as the variance
of persistent shocks to this unpredictable component. Equipped with income risk esti-
mates for several German manufacturing sectors for the years between 1991 (or 1999) and
2005, we links these to offshoring in a panel framework in step three. Offshoring at the
sector level is understood as the amount of intermediate inputs imported from the same
industry abroad divided by industry output. We do not distinguish between within-firm
versus arm’s length transactions as we consider our offshoring variable to approximate the
outcome of any make-or-buy decision. We do, however, treat offshoring to non-OECD
countries with special attention since this is usually the type of production relocation
which stirs up the most anxiety among the public. It is also the type of cost-savings
driven offshoring modeled in most of the theoretical literature on the topic.
Our results are quite remarkable: an increase in offshoring in a given sector correlates
with a decrease in permanent income risk in that sector. Offshoring to non-OECD coun-
tries has a particularly strong impact. We attribute this offshoring related decline in
income risk to the fact that, in countries with relatively rigid labor markets, firms tend
to offshore volatile production intensive parts of their undertakings which leaves the re-
maining tasks less volatile on average. Overall, a decrease in income risk provides a
channel through which offshoring can be welfare enhancing. Of course, this only holds
true if wage and employment levels are not negatively affected by offshoring. Given the
literature’s recent results of no large influence of offshoring on absolute employment and
wage levels in OECD economies, we are indeed leaning towards an optimistic conclusion.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Dieses Diskussionspapier geht der Frage nach, wie sich Auslagerungsprozesse von Produk-
tionsaktivitäten, so-genanntes Offshoring, auf den deutschen Arbeitsmarkt auswirken.
Insbesondere wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Offshoring und Einkommensrisiko be-
handelt - ein Aspekt der bisher in der Literatur kaum Beachtung gefunden hat. Einkom-
mensrisiko bezeichnet hierbei Schocks auf das Einkommen, welche nicht nach kurzer
Zeit auslaufen und daher nicht durch Sparen oder Entsparen selbstständig "versicherbar"
sind. Dieses sogenannte permanente Einkommensrisiko ist eindeutig wohlfahrtsrelevant,
da hiervon die langfristigen Spar- und Konsumentscheidungen risikoaverser Individuen
betroffen sind. Durch die Analyse des Einkommensrisikos tragen wir zudem dadurch zum
Fortschritt der Forschungsliteratur bei, dass wir nicht allein Niveaueffekte untersuchen.
Risikoaverse Individuen benötigen bezüglich wohlfahrtsrelevanter Entscheidungen immer
auch Informationen über die Volatilität des Einkommens.
Unsere Analyse beinhaltet drei Schritte. Zunächst wird der unvorhersehbare Teil des indi-
viduellen Einkommens als der Residualterm einer Lohngleichung geschätzt. Dieser dient
anschließend als Grundlage für die Schätzung des permanenten Einkommensrisikos. Die
resultierenden Werte für verschiedene Sektoren des verarbeitenden Gewerbes in Deutsch-
land zwischen 1991 (bzw. 1999) und 2005 werden anschließend in einer Panelanalyse
mit Daten zur sektoralen Intensität des Offshoring in Verbindung gesetzt. Die Inten-
sität des Offshoring ist hierbei definiert als importierte Zwischenprodukte eines Sektors
welche dem gleichen Sektor im Ausland entstammen, geteilt durch den Gesamtoutput
des Sektors. Wir unterscheiden nicht zwischen Transaktionen innerhalb einer Firma als
rechtlicher Einheit und unabhängigen Zulieferern. Alle Entscheidungen, einen Teil der
Produktion nicht im Inland auszuführen, werden somit durch unser Maß angenähert.
Allerdings rechnen wir Offshoring in nicht-OECD Ländern eine besondere Bedeutung zu,
da diese an Kostenersparnis orientierte Form der Verlagerung die meiste Aufmerksamkeit
in der öffentlichen Diskussion, sowie der theoretischen Modellierung erfährt.
Als Ergebnisse dieser Studie ergeben sich die folgenden Schlussfolgerungen. Ein Anstieg
der Offshoringintensität eines Sektors senkt das durchschnittliche permanente Einkom-
mensrisiko in diesem Sektor, insbesondere wenn in nicht-OECD Länder ausgelagert wird.
Ein Grund für ein solches Ergebnis könnte sein, dass Firmen die volatileren Produktion-
sstufen ins Ausland verlagern und somit die weniger schwankungsanfälligen Tätigkeiten
im Inland verbleiben. Eine solche Tendenz kann sich z.B. daraus ergeben, dass Deutsch-
land auf Grund eines relativ rigiden Arbeitsmarkts einen komparativen Vorteil in weniger
volatilen Teilen der Wertschöpfungskette hat. Sind gleichzeitig keine großen Effekte durch
Offshoring auf das Niveau der Beschäftigung und der Löhne festzustellen, kann Offshoring
somit wohlfahrtssteigernde Effekte haben.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact increased offshoring has on labor income risk.
It is therefore distinct from a large number of studies explaining the level effects
of globalization on the labor market in that it takes a look at effects on second
moments, i.e. the variance of incomes. It provides an assessment that directly con-
nects labor income risk and offshoring trends at the sector level. Importantly, we
distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks to individual income. Perma-
nent income risk is defined as variance of shocks to income that do not fade out over
time and are assumed to be not self-insurable. It thus has a particular relevance
for individual welfare. Our findings suggest that offshoring tends to lower perma-
nent income risk. This effect is particularly strong for offshoring to low-income
destinations. Hence, there could be potential welfare gains when domestic firms
increasingly offshore production to foreign countries.
.
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1 Introduction
Globalization is often perceived as creating a more volatile working environment on the
labor market. In particular, trends such as the relocation of parts of production abroad
(offshoring) induce fears of job loss and higher fluctuations in individual income. While
the long-run level effects of offshoring have been documented by a large literature (see
e.g. Feenstra (2010) and Geishecker and Görg (2008)), a lot less academic attention has
been paid to the analysis of its second moment effects, i.e. effects on the variance of
incomes. Our paper thus aims at further completing the picture of how offshoring has an
impact on characteristics of labor income by estimating the relationship based on data
from German manufacturing. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one to
put the link between offshoring and income risk at the heart of an empirical analysis.
Income risk is defined as the variance of changes in the unexplained component of indi-
vidual income. As such, it describes changes in income that are not a result of observable
and predictable characteristics like age or education. It is unexpected variation from an
ex-ante perspective. Crucially, we distinguish between transitory and permanent risks to
income. Transitory shocks to income are more likely to be smoothed out by self-insurance
mechanisms such as saving and borrowing. However, this does not hold for permanent
shocks, i.e. shocks that permanently shift an individual’s income trajectory. Following
the literature, we assume permanent income risk to be uninsurable from an individual
perspective. Then, unexpected permanent variation in income affects the present value
of lifetime earnings, which has consequences for the consumption and savings decisions
(Aiyagari (1994)). The literature has pointed out the welfare relevance of such changes in
permanent income risk. Consider for example an increase in income risk. Welfare, defined
as the equivalent variation in lifetime consumption, is usually expressed as the amount of
lifetime consumption risk averse individuals would be willing to give up to compensate
for the increase in income risk (Krebs et al. (2010)). It is thus the permanent component
of income shocks we are interested in. Linking offshoring to changes in the variance of
permanent income shocks yields a discussion of the effect of offshoring on labor income
which allows for considerations on welfare consequences.
Most of the related literature on income risk has focused on explaining the welfare
effect of exogenously given changes in income risk. For the analysis in this paper, we shift
the focus towards factors determining trends in income risk. That is, we aim at unveiling
a potential reason for changes in income risk. Taking the effects on welfare as reasonably
established by the literature, it seems to us that identifying the sources of movements in
income risk is a viable contribution to the literature. In this paper we present offshoring
as one such candidate explanation.
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From the outset, it is not clear whether offshoring increases or decreases income risk -
especially with respect to the permanent component. On the one hand, there is empirical
evidence at the sector-level that offshoring tends to raise labor demand elasticities which
could lead to higher income risk (e.g. Senses (2010)). On the other hand, this evidence is
in part contradicted at finer levels of aggregation. Becker and Muendler (2008) find off-
shoring to actually lower separation rates in employment at the firm-level and Buch and
Lipponer (2010) directly cast doubt on the claim that offshoring is responsible for changes
in labor demand elasticities within multinational firms. It is important to note, however,
that most studies within the rather inconclusive empirical literature are only indirectly
related to the concept of income risk, and its permanent component in particular. As
mentioned above, our analysis specifically tries to address a measure of "insecurity" that
has clear and well-documented welfare implications - a characteristic generally attributed
to the permanent component of income risk.
In addition to the mixed empirical results, theory recently suggested offshoring to be
much less of a specter to workers than what is reflected in public anxiety and job loss
fears. For example, Bergin et al. (2009) show that offshoring has the potential to exert
a dampening effect on economic volatility in the offshoring country if demand shocks are
buffered by excess production activity in offshore plants. In other words, fluctuations are
"exported" and firms face a less volatile domestic economic environment; and potentially
their workers do as well.1 It is also possible that offshoring induces what may be called
a "composition effect". If offshoring is understood as trade in tasks, as in Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), and the tasks as such differ in their specific income volatilities, the
relocation of certain tasks abroad might lead to aggregate changes in sector-level income
risk. If the offshored tasks are at the same time more volatile with respect to income, the
average income risk of the tasks remaining onshore falls. One could think of this effect
as arising from firms effectively insuring themselves against fluctuations in economic ac-
tivity. If institutional rigidities in the home market make adjustment costly, firms would
be expected to relocate the activities most affected in places where adjustment is less
costly. Such considerations seem particularly plausible in light of the European Union’s
enlargement to the East and Germany’s location close to the new EU member states.2
Overall, it seems as if a study comprehensively linking offshoring to the permanent
component of income risk – a measure that has been shown to trigger important welfare
1Yet, the opposite holds true for the receiving country. Volatility abroad (e.g. in Mexico for the case
of US offshoring) is amplified.
2Note that this does not necessarily lead to an aggregate employment loss with less volatile yet lower
overall employment at home since offshoring also triggers productivity effects possibly leading to net job
creation (Kohler and Wrona (2010)).
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effects – is missing in the literature so far. This seems somewhat surprising given the high
level of academic and public interest in the topic and its high and rising importance for
open economies worldwide. In the present study we suggest a piece of evidence further
completing the understanding of how globalization interacts with labor markets.
The particular focus on offshoring also sets this paper apart from the recent literature
studying income effects of other forms of globalization such as import competition and
tariff reductions. Aside from the vast amount of studies dealing with level effects on
wages and employment, we know of two other studies taking up the notion of permanent
income risk. Krebs et al. (2010) analyze how tariff reductions and the ensuing integration
of the Mexican economy into the world market (in particular the North American part
of it) affected income risk. They show income risk to increase as a response to trade
liberalization, inducing the emergence of negative welfare effects. Yet, the Mexican econ-
omy may be considered a rather special case, in particular with regard to its proximity
to the US and the existence of the "maquiladora" sector near the northern border.3 Kr-
ishna and Senses (2009) set out to find the roots of income risk for the US labor market.
Their prime candidate is import competition, which they show to raise the permanent
component of income risk.4 Yet, those papers remain fairly general in terms of how trade
openness or a higher share of imported goods in domestic consumption affect income
risk. Also, we stress that offshoring is not the same as final goods trade. It allows for
a task-level arbitrage opening up the possibility of a composition effect as described above.
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we derive and estimate measures of
income risk which we subsequently link to offshoring. We provide two variants of the
analysis. We begin our effort by taking a long-run perspective and estimate the perma-
nent component of income risk from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Here,
income risk is estimated at the sector level from individual income data as the average
variance of changes in the unexplained component of individual income. The latter is
retrieved from standard Mincerian wage regressions. Based on this data, we uncover
average income risk over five-year intervals which we link to average offshoring intensities
at the sector level in the same time dimension. We therefore aim at answering whether
a structural change in the economy, with ever more production stages being performed
abroad, leads to domestically higher or lower income risk. Subsequently, we turn to a
yearly analysis. At this stage we use individual-level data from official German social
3In fact, this "maquiladora" sector has been shown in Bergin et al. (2009) to have a particularly high
volatility due to its role in the production sharing with the US economy.
4As a robustness check, which consists of including a host of further variables, these authors also
employ an offshoring variable which shows a negative coefficient in their estimations. However, this
variable differs in its construction from the ones used here and its impact is not further discussed by the
authors.
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security records, allowing us to link offshoring and income risk at a higher frequency.
Both approaches rely on fixed-effects panel methods, helping us to answer the question
of whether an increase in offshoring over time increases or decreases income risk. The
offshoring measures are calculated at the sector level using detailed yearly import matri-
ces from input-output tables in combination with output and trade data. They represent
the output-share of intermediate goods imported by some sector that originate in the
same sector abroad - a well established concept in the literature used to approximate the
sector-level outcome of multiple make-or-buy decisions at the level of the firm (Feenstra
and Hanson (1996)).
Our findings suggest that an increase in offshoring leads to a decrease in income risk.
The observed rise in the overall offshoring intensity implies, on average, a 11% to 28%
fall in permanent income risk compared to its mean value. For offshoring to non-OECD
countries, the corresponding numbers for the observed increase reach up to around 30%.
Looking at offshoring as a particular type of international trade, we thus find the opposite
effect in comparison with other studies relating globalization to permanent income risk.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section details the approach for esti-
mating income risk, presents the data we use, and gives further insight into measuring
the offshoring intensity at the sector-level. In sections 3 and 4 we describe in detail
the econometric specification and provide results on how income risk is affected by off-
shoring, respectively. A concluding section features some important considerations on
welfare effects.
2 Estimation and Calculation of Variables
2.1 Estimating Labor Income Risk
The approach taken in this paper involves a three-stage procedure to first estimate the
transitory and permanent components of individual income risk (stage one and two), and
then relating these to carefully constructed offshoring indices at the sector level (stage
three). The goal of this section is to motivate our measure of income risk and to derive
the corresponding estimation procedure. We follow the bulk of the literature and define
income risk as the unpredictability of individual income while referring to this variability
from an ex-ante perspective (Carroll and Samwick (1997); Meghir and Pistaferri (2004),
among others). As such, income risk accompanies people whenever their future income
is stochastic. In this sense, income risk is conceptualized as a deviation of the future
income stream from its expectation, and is estimated as the variance of changes in the
unexpected component of individual income.
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In our paper, as in most of the related literature, the estimated income risk has two
components: transitory income risk and permanent income risk. This distinction is im-
portant since the two components have vastly different welfare effects. Transitory risk
refers to the variance of stochastic income changes without persistence. Therefore, it
could be effectively "self-insured" by individuals through saving and borrowing. Such
unexpected transitory variation could be introduced by windfall labor income or changes
in hours worked, which do not persist until the end of an individual’s working life. More-
over, in the estimation transitory income risk measurement error in data is also usually
captured. Thus, there are no reasons for individuals to change their consumption and
savings pattern, and therefore there are hardly any welfare effects (Levine and Zame
(2002)). For the permanent component of income shocks, however, a different picture
emerges. Permanent income risk has profound effects on the consumption-savings de-
cision of individuals in environments with imperfect insurance possibilities. Permanent
income shocks reflect the stochastic trend of income. These shocks have persistent power
over the remaining working period of individuals. This affects the present value of life-
time earnings and thus individuals consume out a certain amount of permanent shocks.
Therefore, and in contrast to transitory risk, permanent income risk has a direct effect
on individual welfare (Constantinides and Duffie (1996), and Krebs (2003)). Permanent
shocks are observed as permanent events during workers’ employment - for example, pro-
motion beyond expectation or changes in employment resulting in a different matching
quality of an individual’s abilities and the job’s requirements. Given its welfare relevance,
we thus focus our analysis on the connection between offshoring and permanent labor in-
come risk. Following related studies, we disregard the transitory component.5
The procedure for estimating the components of income risk starts with the identifi-
cation of the unexplained component of individual income. This component is retrieved
as the residual from standard Mincerian wage regressions of the following form:
yit = αjt + βtXijt + uijt (1)
Note that the regressions are run year-by-year and include fixed-effects for sectors j. The
control vector Xijt includes the commonly used wage determinants such as age, educa-
tion, marital status, nationality and firm-size.6 Notice that the estimation allows for
changes in the returns to observable characteristics. An increase in the skill premium,
5As stated before, another reason for ignoring transitory income risk is that this measure will pick up
all measurement error in the estimation procedure outlined below (also see Krebs et al. (2010)).
6In the GSOEP data, due to the lower number of observations at our disposal, we include both male
and female individuals and add a corresponding dummy variable to the control vector. In the BA data,
we focus on male individuals since they are usually assumed to be the household head with their income
being less affected by intra-household labor substitution.
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for instance, is not regarded as contributing to income risk. The regressions are run on a
restricted sample which includes individuals fully employed in manufacturing industries
in West Germany. yit is the natural logarithm of our income variable for individual i in
year t, specified in more detail in the database descriptions below. The above model im-
plies that individuals derive their expectations about the future income from a projection
based upon their observable and predictable characteristics. Thus, uijt is the unexpected
and stochastic component of individual earnings, which is idiosyncratic and unpredictable
to them. We show exemplary results from this first stage regression in the appendix.
For the estimation of income risk and its components we make the following assump-
tions. Suppose uijt has two components: a permanent one ωijt and a transitory one ijt.
Furthermore, assume ωit to follow a random walk process.7
uijt = ωijt + ijt (2)
ωijt = ωijt−1 + ηijt (3)
In equation (2), ijt is white noise, which has only a temporary effect on labor income
and would vanish in the next time period. ηijt, however, has persistence because ωijt
follows a random walk process.
Based on this assumed structure of the unexplained part of income, we can single out
the permanent component of income risk. Recall that we are interested in the variance of
the changes in this unexplained part of income. There are two different strategies usually
employed in the literature. They differ in their assumptions of whether income risk can be
assumed to be time-independent. As can be seen from the following subsections, assuming
time-independence (at least within sub-periods) substantially simplifies the estimation.
We will nevertheless calculate both time-invariant and year-specific income risk. However,
we will have to use different data sources in the two cases.
7The random walk assumption is not the only possible structure underlying the income process. For
instance, other papers have suggested including a third (MA(1)) component. Yet, as Krebs and Yao
(2009) show, the permanent component of income risk is hardly affected by different assumptions on the
income process. We therefore stick to the random walk assumption.
6
2.1.1 Time-invariant Income Risks
In this subsection, we assume that shocks are time-invariant, that is, it and ηit in each
period are white noise and i.i.d distributed.8
it ∼ N(0, σ2 ) (4)
ηit ∼ N(0, σ2η) (5)
it and ηit are independent for all leads and lags, that is, cov(it, is) = 0,∀t 6= s, cov(ηit, ηis) =
0,∀t 6= s, cov(it, ηis) = 0, ∀t, s. For the changes in the unexplained income over time, we
can generally write the n-year difference of uijt as
4nuit = uit+n − uit = ηit+1 + ...+ ηit+n + it+n − it (6)
Hence, assuming ηi = ηit the variance of 4nuit is simply given by:
V [4nuit] = nσ2η + 2σ2 (7)
where σ2 and σ2η are the variances of the transitory and permanent shocks to income,
respectively. Note that 2σ2 is a constant. Thus, the simplifying assumption of time-
invariant income risk allows us to retrieve σˆ2η from a simple linear regression.9 This is
the approach taken by the vast majority of the literature (see for example Gottschalk
and Moffitt (1994); Carroll and Samwick (1997); Krishna and Senses (2009)). Note that
with a sufficiently large T , it is possible to still retrieve quasi time-varying coefficients for
income risk if time-independence is assumed to hold within but not between subperiods
m. This is the approach we follow for part of the analysis in this paper where we assume
income risk to be constant within 5 year sub-periods.
2.1.2 Time-specific Income Risks
The above assumption of time-independence may seem to be a strong one, and the quick-
fix solution of looking at changes in permanent income risk between subperiods somewhat
arbitrarily rests on the choice of the length of m. Shocks to permanent labor income
in reality could differ across time periods due to, e.g. macroeconomic factors such as
business cycle movements or trade related influences.10 In fact, this is exactly what our
8In this section we drop the subscript j to improve on the exposition. Naturally, all income risk
measures estimated and used in the analysis in further sections are to be understood as sector-level
variables.
9In more detail, we minimize
∑
t
∑T−t
1 [V [4nuit]− (nσ2η + 2σ2 )]2 by using OLS methods.
10Storesletten et al. (2004) argue that the conditional variance of these permanent income shocks is
counter-cyclical, increasing during contractions and decreasing during expansions. Krebs et al. (2010)
find that trade policy has a significant effect on income risk.
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paper is aiming to identify: How changes in permanent income risk can be explained.
We therefore briefly describe the adjustments needed for estimation of yearly values of
permanent income risk.
Dropping the assumption of time-constancy of income risk, it and ηit are no more i.i.d
normally distributed in each period, but dependent on time, that is,
it ∼ N(0, σ2t) (8)
ηit ∼ N(0, σ2ηt) (9)
Still, it and ηit are independent with each other at all leads and lags. cov(it, is) =
0,∀t 6= s, cov(ηit, ηis) = 0,∀t 6= s, cov(ηit, is) = 0, ∀t, s.
In contrast to (7) above, the variance of changes in the unexplained component of indi-
vidual income between period t and t+ n now is given by:
V [4nuit+n] = σ2η,t+1 + ...+ σ2η,t+n + σ2,t + σ2,t+n. (10)
The estimation furthermore relies on additional moment conditions for the transitory
component. In particular, it is assumed that this component of income risk is identical
for the first and last two periods. Naturally, this also restricts the permanent component
to being the same for those periods. According to Krebs et al. (2010), the permanent
component of income risk can be estimated from (10) using GMMmethods. In particular,
given the relatively small sample size of our available data, we use the EWMD (equally
weighted minimum distance) estimator.
2.2 Data and Implementation
In order to implement the above estimation strategy, our data has to meet certain re-
quirements. On the one hand, we need a sufficient amount of variation within each sector
for each year. On the other hand, it is desirable to have a long time dimension in order
to track the relationship of offshoring and income risk for several years. We have two
different datasets at our disposal, each of which has its particular advantages. The first
datset is a long-run survey, the so-called German Socio-Economic panel (GSOEP).11 The
second is a sample from official social security records from the German Employment
Agency ("BA-Employmentpanel").12
11The GSOEP data are provided by the DIW Institute in Berlin. Information on variables and data
access can be gained at http://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.222724.en/soepinfo.html
12This study uses the factually anonymous BA-Employment Panel (Years 1998 - 2007). Data access
was provided via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal
Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). For detailed information
on the database, see Schmucker and Seth (2009).
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In both cases we use information on income for individuals that stay within the same
sector over time.13 We thus predominantly observe income variation for people who
remain employed, yet face income changes due to wage changes and changes in other
payments such as bonuses. Yet, we do not exclude individuals that lose their job and
are re-employed in the same industry, irrespective of how long this unemployment spell
is.14 In fact, temporary job loss is likely an important source of variation in income as
job transition is often accompanied by a loss of occupation or employer-specific human
capital leading to persistent changes in income. We do not, however, include variation
based on individuals switching between sectors or out of manufacturing in general.15 We
admit that switching sectors can be a source of income risk, yet one that is difficult to
link to offshoring in our framework. In particular, it is not clear which industry-level
offshoring intensity to consider for such individuals.16 Even within these limits, we will
show that there is considerable variation in individual income and that a substantial part
of this is reflected in permanent income risk.
2.2.1 German Socio-Economic Panel Data
While the GSOEP data covers individuals since the mid-1980s and therefore allows for a
longer-run view on income risk, it has insufficient observations by year and industry to
fully estimate time-varying income risk. We therefore divide this data into 5-year sub-
periods and estimate the permanent component of income risk based on (7) within each
one of them. Thus, we assume that the transitory and permanent components can change
between periods, but are constant within each 5-year period. That is, it ∼ N(0, σ2,m),
ηit ∼ N(0, σ2η,m). The wage regressions are run on a sample restricted to west German
residents aged 18 to 65 that are fully employed in one of the 22 two-digit NACE manu-
facturing industries. The income variable in this case is the hourly wage rate, for which
we set a threshold at the minimum social security transfer payment in order to exclude
individuals who report implausibly low labor income. We also adjust for oversampling of
high income individuals.
13About 87.25% of observed individuals stay within the same 2-digit sector.
14Only if an individual never returns into employment until the end of our sample it is not included
after once losing the job.
15If an individual is employed in several sectors over the sample period, we treat it as if it were two
different individuals. That is, we use variation occurring during employment within a sector, but not
between sectors.
16Krishna and Senses (2009) estimate income risk to be higher for individuals experiencing a transition
from one sector to another when compared to individuals staying in one sector. We thus regard our
estimations of income risk as representing a lower bound. On the difficulty of including this variation in
a study exploring the causes for changes in income risk, also see Krebs et al. (2010)).
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2.2.2 BA-Employment-Panel Data
In contrast to the GSOEP, the BA-Panel is rather short with its 10 year time period.
Yet, it has significantly more observations per industry and year. Thus, it allows us to
estimate yearly income risk. It represents a 2 percent random sample drawn from official
German employment records based on social security contributions for the years from
1998 to 2007. Income information in this case is monthly income and includes non-wage
payments such as bonuses to the employees. Again, we restrict the panel to full-time
employed, working age, west German residents. This still leaves us with a total of more
than 770,000 individual observations. We then proceed by applying the estimation ap-
proach for time-varying income risk. Note that our focus on permanent income implies
that we only obtain estimates for the years up to 2005, since persistence of shocks is
hardly observed when approaching the last year of sample. Furthermore our estimation
approach technically relies on the additional assumption that in the first two periods, in-
come risk values are identical. This leaves us with observations for the years 1999 to 2005.
A common concern about such official German employment records is that the ac-
companying income information is censored at the legal threshold for social security
contributions. This is the case in the present data as well. It is of potential concern
that some income variation might be precluded from the analysis. Note that even an
approach as ours, which relies on variation over time between sectors when linking off-
shoring and income risk, is affected since the share of individuals at the income threshold
is non-constant. On the other hand, the problem is less severe in manufacturing and in
particular among low-skilled workers. These individuals simply rarely reach the threshold
income. Yet, we tackle the problem, as most studies in the literature (e.g. Dustmann
et al. (2009)), by imputing the censored part of the wage distribution. We follow Gartner
(2005) and use an approach based on truncated regressions and draws from a log-normal
distribution.17
Finally, the BA-panel data is quarterly in its original style. Yet, most of the income
information is based on one entry per year only (so called "Jahresmeldung"). Thus, only
yearly information can be calculated. We do so by using time-weighted averages over all
reported monthly income data points as long as the individual does not change the sector
of employment within the year. In order to check if this latter feature is too restrictive,
we also provide estimates based on just using information from a single wave per year;
the June wave in our case. These alternative estimates do not much affect our results
and are shown in the appendix.
17Note that censoring of the wage variable plays no role in the GSOEP as this is survey data.
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2.3 Income Risk: Results
Table 1 shows estimates of the permanent component of income risk based on the GSOEP
data.18 It can be seen that the estimates vary quite a bit across sectors, both with re-
spect to levels and the change from the first to the last period.19 The estimates imply
an employment weighted average standard deviation of 0.077. That implies an average
(permanent) yearly change of 8% of the residual hourly wage rate.
In table 2, we present results derived from the more detailed BA-panel. Again, we
see some heterogeneity across industries. The estimates are similar, yet a bit lower than
the ones in table 1. The employment weighted average risk to residual monthly wages
stands at around 6 %. The differences in the estimated values for permanent income
risk stem mainly from the use of different data. In particular, income risk estimates are
usually sensitive to sample length. More importantly, we do not rely on level values in
our estimations below. Instead we estimate the effect using fixed-effect methods in a
panel setting.
The above estimates are somewhat lower than those found in other studies (e.g. Krebs
et al. (2010)). Note however, that this latter study, as well as others, overestimates
permanent income risk since it assumes all remaining income variation after 4 quarters
to be permanent, whereas we treat changes from one year to the next as transitory still.
Furthermore, some studies rely on total household income which inherently has higher
risk since it includes the outcomes of labor-leisure choice and substitution effects between
household members. Additionally, it is plausible that by international standards the
German labor market features lower income risk due to stronger institutions such as
employment protection and wage bargaining coordination.
18Since our offshoring data is for the years after 1991 only, we do not show income risk estimates prior
to 1991.
19Note that for sector 36, the estimate is negative which is unrealistic since a variance is by definition a
positive value. This estimate, as well a few others, is not statistically significant, however. We will show
later on that exclusion of the few insignificant income risk estimates does not alter much our estimates
of the influence of offshoring on income risk.
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Table 1: Descriptives: Income Risk, GSOEP
Industry Code σˆ2η,j σˆη,j Change(σˆ2η,j)
Food Products And Beverages 15 0.0080 0.0896 0.0103
Tobacco Products 16 0.0301 0.1736 -0.0022
Textiles 17 0.0044 0.0661 0.0027
Wearing Apparel; Dressing And Dyeing 18 0.0074 0.0859 -0.0048
Tanning,Dressing Of Leather; luggage 19 0.0376 0.1940 0.0210
Wood Products, Except Furniture 20 0.0012 0.0347 -0.0010
Pulp, Paper And Paper Products 21 0.0081 0.0901 0.0116
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction 22 0.0072 0.0850 -0.0074
Coke, Refined Petroleum Prod. 23 0.0126 0.1121 0.0067
Chemicals And Chemical Products 24 0.0067 0.0816 0.0124
Rubber And Plastic Products 25 0.0111 0.1055 0.0084
Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 26 0.0018 0.0425 -0.0006
Basic Metals 27 0.0085 0.0921 0.0263
Fabricated Metal Prod., Ex. Machinery 28 0.0043 0.0657 0.0165
Machinery And Equipment NEC 29 0.0054 0.0732 0.0021
Office Machinery And Computers 30 0.0278 0.1667 -0.0036
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus 31 0.0048 0.0690 -0.0020
Radio, Television And Communication 32 0.0029 0.0538 0.0028
Medical, Precision And Optical Instr. 33 0.0056 0.0751 0.0089
Motor Vehicles, Trailers 34 0.0071 0.0842 0.0003
Other Transport Equipment 35 0.0099 0.0994 -0.0051
Furniture; Manufacturing NEC 36 -0.0006 -0.0032
Notes Values for income risk are averages over time. Changes are first-to-last pe-
riod differences of absolute values. The employment weighted industry average (excl.
Tobacco) is 7,7 % (¯ˆση,j = 0.077).Industry names may be incomplete.
Table 2: Descriptives: Income Risk, BA-panel
Industry Code σˆ2η,j σˆη,j Change (σˆ2η,j)
Food Products And Beverages 15 0.0037 0.0607 0.0008
Textiles 17 0.0043 0.0657 -0.0007
Wearing Apparel; Dressing And Dyeing 18 0.0041 0.0639 0.0069
Wood Products, Except Furniture 20 0.0026 0.0514 0.0074
Pulp, Paper And Paper Products 21 0.0028 0.0526 -0.0031
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction 22 0.0044 0.0664 -0.0023
Chemicals And Chemical Products 24 0.0025 0.0501 0.0014
Rubber And Plastic Products 25 0.0038 0.0619 -0.0010
Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 26 0.0031 0.0559 0.0041
Basic Metals 27 0.0030 0.0550 -0.0015
Fabricated Metal Prod., Ex. Machinery 28 0.0042 0.0649 -0.0009
Machinery And Equipment NEC 29 0.0035 0.0594 -0.0003
Office Machinery And Computers 30 0.0057 0.0754 -0.0129
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus 31 0.0034 0.0584 -0.0019
Radio, Television And Communication 32 0.0041 0.0638 0.0028
Medical, Precision And Optical Instr. 33 0.0035 0.0588 0.0017
Motor Vehicles, Trailers 34 0.0023 0.0483 0.0011
Other Transport Equipment 35 0.0030 0.0544 0.0015
Furniture; Manufacturing NEC 36 0.0041 0.0644 0.0006
Notes Values for income risk are averages over time. Changes are first-to-last period
differences of absolute values. The employment weighted industry average is 5.8 %
(¯ˆση,j = 0.058).Industry names may be incomplete.
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2.4 Measuring the Offshoring Intensity
Offshoring is measured using input-output tables and trade data following a method
introduced by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and extended by Geishecker (2006). The
offshoring intensities are calculated to represent the amount of an industry’s interme-
diate inputs purchased from the same industry abroad in total industry output. This
emphasizes the fact that the product could have likely been produced at home as well,
and precludes situations in which traditionally imported goods count as offshoring. The
offshoring intensity therefore is assumed to describe the outcome of multiple firm’s make-
or-buy decisions aggregated to the sector level. Note that it captures offshoring that
occurs within as well as outside of a firm. In terms of the original notation introduced by
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) our measure is the offshoring intensity in a "narrow" sense.
Technically it looks as follows:
OFFjt =
IMPj∗t × Ωj∗jt
Yjt
. (11)
Yjt is output of j at time t. Ωj∗jt describes the share of imports from a specific 2-digit
NACE industry (j∗) abroad used in the respective industry (j) at home. These shares are
derived from yearly import matrices that are part of the input-output tables provided
by the Statistical Office in Germany.20 IMPj∗t are imports from the foreign industry
j∗, taken from the OECD STAN database. The data on imports and industry output
are deflated using an aggregate manufacturing import price deflator and industry-specific
producer price indices, respectively. This deflation strategy may be problematic, however,
if sector-level import prices deviate strongly from the average. Consider, for example, a
situation in which the import price falls strongly for a certain industry. This fall will not
be adequately captured by the average import price index which will be "too high". Yet,
to the extent that the same price trends are also present in the producer prices, where
they are adequately represented due to the more disaggregated indices, there will be an
"asymmetric" deflation that by itself raises the offshoring intensity. In the subsequent
estimations we therefore also check whether deflating all variables with aggregate indices
affects the results.
We furthermore differentiate between worldwide offshoring and offshoring to non-
OECD countries. Here we again draw on the OECD STAN database and multiply the
imports in (11) by the share of imports coming from non-OECD countries.21 Note that
20For the years prior to 1995 those tables are not comparable to the more recent ones due to data
revisions. For those years we keep Ωj∗jt constant at its 1995 value - a strategy commonly employed in
the literature whenever yearly I-O tables are not available (see e.g. Hijzen and Swaim (2010)).
21When calculating import shares for non-OECD countries, we had to aggregate sectors 15-16; 17-19
and 21-22. Note, however, that this only applies to the non-OECD trade share and neither to total
imports nor Ωj∗jt.
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this region-specific calculation of offshoring entails the common assumption of identical
Ωj∗jt for the two groups of countries, since the input-output tables do not hold any region
specific information. The special distinction of non-OECD offshoring is meant to reflect
the cost savings motive inherent in offshoring - a concept at the core of most theoretical
approaches as well as the common public worries.
Table 3 shows offshoring intensities for the different manufacturing industries. Over-
all, worldwide offshoring has reached significantly higher levels than offshoring to low-
income countries. Yet, starting from low values, growth is much stronger for offshoring
to non-OECD countries where intensities have more than doubled in 9 industries. Ad-
ditionally, we observe positive growth in all industries but tobacco as well as coke and
refined petroleum for non-OECD offshoring, while only about two thirds of the industries
had a higher worldwide offshoring intensity in 2005 compared to 1991. Interestingly, for
both measures the sectors show quite some heterogeneity with respect to variations over
time. This variation will be important in identifying the effect of offshoring on income
risk later on.
Table 3: Offshoring - descriptives
worldwide non-OECD
Industry Code 1991 2005 change 1991 2005 change
Food Products And Beverages 15 3.85 3.97 0.12 0.61 0.63 0.02
Tobacco 16 1.00 0.88 -0.13 0.16 0.14 -0.02
Textiles 17 10.70 8.79 -1.91 3.95 4.42 0.47
Wearing Apparel; Dressing 18 12.13 12.94 0.81 4.48 6.51 2.03
Tanning And Dressing of Leather, 19 19.30 18.19 -1.11 7.13 9.15 2.02
Wood Products, Except Furniture 20 4.73 3.49 -1.24 1.06 1.11 0.06
Pulp, Paper And Paper Products 21 9.87 8.87 -1.01 0.40 0.54 0.15
Publishing, Printing 22 0.47 0.92 0.45 0.02 0.06 0.04
Coke, Refined petroleum products 23 3.12 3.33 0.21 0.56 0.45 -0.10
Chemicals And Chemical Products 24 11.77 13.73 1.96 0.81 0.98 0.18
Rubber And Plastic Products 25 1.05 1.48 0.43 0.08 0.19 0.12
Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 26 2.36 2.08 -0.28 0.27 0.34 0.07
Basic Metals 27 12.65 16.35 3.70 2.19 3.36 1.17
Fabricated Metal Prod., excl. Mach. 28 1.15 1.81 0.66 0.23 0.37 0.15
Machinery And Equipment NEC 29 4.48 7.35 2.86 0.54 1.94 1.40
Office Machinery And Computers 30 16.60 13.85 -2.75 2.51 6.06 3.56
Electrical Machinery 31 2.84 6.57 3.73 0.39 1.52 1.13
Radio, Television, Communication 32 17.67 19.75 2.07 3.33 6.99 3.66
Medical, Precision And Optical 33 2.52 4.52 2.01 0.25 0.71 0.46
Motor Vehicles, Trailers 34 12.71 10.21 -2.49 0.39 0.55 0.16
Other Transport Equipment 35 10.12 13.03 2.91 0.37 1.18 0.81
Furniture; Manufacturing NEC 36 2.21 9.42 7.20 0.61 3.81 3.20
Notes: Values are calculated according to OFFjt =
IMPj∗t×Ωj∗jt
Yjt
and represent percentage
values. Changes are absolute changes.
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3 Econometric Specification
We now turn to developing a suitable estimation strategy for an evaluation of the impact
of offshoring on income risk. The data at hand permits a panel approach controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity in two dimensions: industry and time. Industry-specific effects
may well matter for the relationship between offshoring and income risk. Some industries
are probably more inherently risky than others. This may be due to different demand
elasticities for their products or unique employment structures in terms of jobs and tasks
that can differ in their idiosyncratic risk. As long as these characteristics are specific
to an industry and do not vary over time, a fixed-effects setup will capture this type of
unobserved heterogeneity. For time-varying coefficients that are unobservable to us, such
as business cycle effects at the country or world level, we can employ time fixed-effects
which capture this variation as long as it is uniform across industries. All remaining
variation will have to be picked up by the variables included in the model. These will
naturally be measures for offshoring along with controls for technological change, and
other time-varying industry specific variables. We will specify the exact nature of the
control vector further below. At this point it is sufficient to state that identification of
the effect of offshoring on income risk will be based on differential movements in sector-
level offshoring over time. A further point deserves attention. Given the structure of our
dataset, we have to be careful when calculating standard errors (Krebs et al. (2010)). Our
dependent variable σ2ηjt is by itself the outcome of an estimation at the sector-level. With
different standard errors across sectors from the first-stage estimations, we are facing het-
eroscedasticity. Furthermore, there is the possibility of serial dependence of error terms
within sectors. We therefore follow the literature in reporting robust standard errors.22
With the above considerations in mind, we arrive at the following empirical models,
where the first one is applied to the long-run dataset based on m 5-year average values
and the second model is used in the analysis of the yearly data. Importantly, this latter
model also allows for the inclusion of lagged effects of offshoring on income risk:
σ2ηjm = β1OFFjm + γXjm + φj + ϕm + νjm (12)
σ2ηjt = ΣNi=0βiOFFjt−i + γXjt + φj + ϕt + νjt (13)
In these models, the control vector Xjt holds a variable approximating technological
progress using the share of R&D expenditure in industry value-added as suggested by the
literature. Country-wide trends in technology upgrading that are unrelated to offshoring
but impact on income risk are picked up by the year effects. Furthermore, it includes mea-
22Krebs et al. (2010) state that the dependent variable being the outcome of an estimation does not
introduce a bias in the coefficient estimates.
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sures for the export-share in production (capturing another dimension of dependency on
international output fluctuations), the import penetration ratio (to provide for a compar-
ison with the literature – Krishna and Senses (2009) in particular), and the industry level
labor share of income (meant to broadly capture the influence of labor market institu-
tions on income risk).23 In addition we use different measures for the offshoring intensity
based on an alternative deflation strategy (using aggregate price indices for both imports
and output) and differentiate between worldwide offshoring and offshoring to non-OECD
countries, the latter again based on the standard deflation procedure. In both cases φj
represents the industry fixed-effects. ϕm and ϕt are binary variables for 5-year periods
(m) and years (t), respectively. νjm and νjt represent the two model’s error terms.
4 Results: Offshoring Lowers Income Risk.
In this subsection we present the results based on the above models. We begin with a
discussion of model 1’s results and subsequently turn to model 2.
Table 4 has a clear message: an increase in offshoring correlates with lower income risk.
We find negative coefficients on the different offshoring variables throughout columns (1)
to (6) in table 4. The results are statistically significant as well. The coefficient value
in column (1) implies that, on average, an increase in the offshoring intensity by one
percentage point - which is close to but a little lower than the actual observed change in
aggregate manufacturing offshoring of about 1.3 percentage points - decreases the per-
manent component of income risk by -0.00131. Compared to its (employment weighted)
mean across industries and over time of 0.0060, this represents a decrease of more than
20% for every percentage point increase in the overall offshoring intensity. The effect is
stronger for offshoring to non-OECD countries. The results in column (3) show the effect
to be roughly three times the size of the corresponding value for worldwide offshoring.
This type of offshoring, however, shows a smaller absolute increase over time; roughly
half a percentage point.
Including a number of sector-level control variables leaves the main message un-
touched. Offshoring is still a negative and significant influence on income risk. Yet,
the coefficients of the control variables hold a small bit of additional information. The
import penetration ratio is found to increase income risk. A finding which weakly con-
firms the result found in Krishna and Senses (2009) for the US also for Germany. The
labor share on the other hand correlates negatively with permanent income risk. This
may express the influence labor market institutions and union presence have in smooth-
23All these data are retrieved from the OECD STAN database.
16
ing the long-run income path. The R&D share does not have any significant effects. It
seems as if this variable is unable to approximate technological change above common
aggregate-level trends captured by the time dummies. Overall, the above results suggest
that offshoring-induced structural change within manufacturing - with an ever higher
share of tasks located abroad - is associated with a decrease in income risk.
Table 4: Results based on 5-year averages, 1991-2005
income risk (permanent component) 1 2 3 4 5 6
offshoring intensity (world) -0.131** -0.179**
(0.0586) (0.0659)
offshoring intensity (world; alt. defl.) -0.105* -0.139**
(0.0585) (0.0653)
offshoring intensity (non-OECD) -0.350** -0.379*
(0.165) (0.213)
export-share in production -0.0667 -0.0253 -0.0514
(0.0417) (0.0402) (0.0348)
import penetration 0.0705 0.0350 0.0674*
(0.0432) (0.0385) (0.0375)
RnD share in value added 7.03e-05 0.000117 -1.98e-05
(0.000346) (0.000332) (0.000399)
laborshare -0.0293* -0.0276 -0.0290*
(0.0162) (0.0180) (0.0165)
time-period fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 66 66 66 63 63 63
R-squared 0.186 0.200 0.181 0.288 0.232 0.287
Number of sectors 22 22 22 21 21 21
Notes: Estimation is by fixed-effects. The coefficient values on the offshoring measures are to be understood
as follows: a one unit change in offshoring (= percentage point change) corresponds to a βˆ/100 change in the
variance of persistent changes in the unexplained component of income (= permanent income risk). Sector 36
has incomplete data coverage which leads to a slightly reduced number of observations in some cases. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In table 5, we turn to the results based on model 2 using yearly data. Again, we find
income risk to be reduced by an increase in offshoring. We present results for one-year
lagged values of offshoring as explanatory variables, because we do not find any signifi-
cant contemporaneous correlation. This points to the impact offshoring has on income
risk as the outcome of a change in how employment and production are organized inter-
nationally. Recall, that income risk measures shocks from an ex-ante perspective, i.e. it
describes how shocks at a given time play out over future periods. We can therefore state
that, on average, workers in an industry that shifts more tasks abroad will subsequently
face less severe shocks to permanent income.24
The coefficient values are somewhat smaller now, thus implying a decrease in income
risk of only about 8% compared to the mean value following an increase in the overall
offshoring intensity by one percentage point. The results are not strictly comparable to
24This does not say anything about the possible effects of displacements at the margin of offshoring.
Yet, offshoring does not seem to be a major cause of overall job-loss at the sector-level (OECD (2007)).
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the ones of model 1, however, because they are based on different datasets and a different
estimation of income risk itself.25 Furthermore, for offshoring to non-OECD countries,
which again triggers larger coefficients, we also find significant effects of two-year lagged
offshoring intensities.26 This could point to model 1’s results representing a cumulative
effect over the multiple-year period. Turning back to the estimates on single period lags,
the coefficient for non-OECD offshoring implies roughly a forty percent decrease in per-
manent income risk for every percentage point increase in offshoring (compared to the
mean value of income risk). Note, however, that average offshoring to non-OECD coun-
tries grew from 0.8% to 1.4% - a change of a little more than half a percentage point.
With respect to the control variables, not much seems to be gained from their inclusion.
None of them have a significant impact, although the labor share and the import pene-
tration ratio show the same sign as in table 4.
In summary, our results from both models show a negative and significant effect
of offshoring on the permanent component of income risk. Offshoring to non-OECD
countries has a particularly strong effect.
Table 5: Results based yearly data, 1999-2005
income risk (permanent component) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (world) -0.0282* -0.0278*
(0.0148) (0.0139)
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (world; alt. defl.) -0.0344* -0.0291*
(0.0188) (0.0144)
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (non-OECD) -0.145* -0.120**
(0.0715) (0.0552)
export-share in production -0.0314* -0.0291 -0.0275
(0.0180) (0.0168) (0.0174)
import penetration 0.0227 0.0226 0.0218
(0.0197) (0.0190) (0.0197)
RnD share in value added 0.000162 0.000104 4.43e-05
(0.000179) (0.000152) (0.000136)
laborshare 0.00109 0.00232 0.00289
(0.00741) (0.00687) (0.00623)
year fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 114 114 114 108 108 108
R-squared 0.189 0.263 0.308 0.364 0.388 0.409
Number of sector 19 19 19 18 18 18
Notes: Estimation is by fixed-effects. The coefficient values on the offshoring measures are to be understood
as follows: a one unit change in offshoring (= percentage point change) corresponds to a βˆ/100 change in the
variance of persistent changes in the unexplained component of income (= permanent income risk). Sector 36
has incomplete data coverage which leads to a slightly reduced number of observations in some cases. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
25Furthermore, the BA-panel data do not allow us to estimate income risk for manufacturing sectors
19 and 23, which turn out to be marked by particularly high levels of income risk. Excluding those
sectors in the estimation of model 1 lowers the coefficient on the offshoring variable and brings it closer
to the values obtained from model 2.
26The results are not shown in the present table for the sake of expositional clarity. The coefficient
value for 2-year lagged non-OECD offshoring is -.11 with a robust standard error of .062 for the model
including all controls.
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5 Concluding Remarks
The analysis in this paper aims at delivering insights into the reasons for changes in
income risk. Income risk is an important factor in determining the consumption, savings
and also growth patterns of an economy. We single out offshoring as a potential influence
given the anxiety it regularly stirs up in the public debate as well as its growing role as
a large part of international trade transactions. Within the limits of our available data,
we seeks to answer whether the fears regarding income insecurity often associated with it
are justified. We find that they are not. On the contrary, within manufacturing sectors,
offshoring is associated with a decrease in permanent income risk.
In our empirical analysis, we first estimate sector-level income risk from individual
level data, isolating the welfare-relevant permanent component for two different data-
sets. We then link it to offshoring at the sector level in a panel framework. We find
offshoring to have a negative and statistically significant effect on income risk for em-
ployees within sectors in manufacturing. Furthermore, there is strong evidence for a
differentiated impact across destination regions, with a stronger than average effect for
offshoring to non-OECD countries. This is expected as offshoring in this case is closer to
a process of wage related labor substitution in an ongoing reallocation of different tasks
around the globe.
However, with respect to welfare implications the results are less straight forward.
Clearly, taken by itself, a reduction in income risk brought about by a higher offshoring
intensity would imply a positive welfare effect. Yet, this effect might not be the only
welfare-affecting change. Two points deserve particular attention. First, the wage level
matters as well. Individuals may have a smaller benefit if risk decreases but this comes
as a trade-off with lower average wages. Yet, on an aggregate level, this is not neces-
sarily to be expected. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) theoretically show that the
wage effects of offshoring are ambiguous, and empirical evidence often documents relative
wages for different skill groups to change while overall wages are hardly affected. Leaving
considerations with respect to a skill-specific effect to further research, we are therefore
leaning towards the conclusion that lower income risk does not come at the cost of lower
average wages in manufacturing.
The second possible concern is related to employment levels. A shift of more volatile
occupations (or tasks) abroad may change average income risk in the home country at the
expense of lower overall employment levels. The volatile jobs would move offshore and –
as a consequence – the remaining ones show a lower average risk. Yet, it is hard to argue
that this situation is desirable from an aggregate perspective if overall employment falls.
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Ideally, if composition effects are at work, one would want the home employment to stay
constant or to grow due to productivity effects from offshoring and the workers whose
tasks are moved offshore would find re-employment in less volatile jobs. There are some
hints that offshoring is not responsible for falling employment levels in manufacturing.
For instance, the OECD states that " (...) the industrial sectors that have most downsized
their workforce are not the ones that have most engaged in offshoring. Offshoring does not
therefore emerge as a major cause of job losses." (OECD (2007)). This finding has recently
been confirmed by Harrison and McMillan (2011) for the United States, who find most of
the manufacturing employment decline to be a result of capital-labor substitution rather
than international labor reallocation. We therefore conclude on a slightly optimistic tone.
If offshoring lowers income risk while average wages do not fall and overall employment
stays widely unaffected, there may be positive effects on welfare.
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Appendix
This first additional table (6) shows results from the first stage regression generating
the income residuals. Coefficients on sector fixed-effects are not shown. The results are
based on BA data with imputed wages from the cross section for the year 2005. Results
for any other year virtually look the same. All coefficients have the expected sign and
significance. That is, income grows with age, skill, firm size, etc.
Table 6: First stage wage regression for 2005
ln wage 1
age 0.00893***
(0.000101)
foreign nationality -0.0984***
(0.00343)
firm size 0.0532***
(0.000612)
medium skilled 0.218***
(0.00517)
highly skilled 0.480***
(0.00324)
constant 7.169***
(0.00661)
sector fixed effects yes
Observations 72,904
R-squared 0.461
The following table 7 provides results from using BA data from the June waves only.
As in all previous tables, offshoring is associated with a decrease in permanent income
risk.
In table 8 we address the concern of some income risk estimates being individually
insignificant when using GSOEP data. (With the BA data we do not face this problem to
any comparable extent.) We simply drop these observations and re-run the regressions.
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Table 7: Results based yearly data, 1999-2005, June waves only
income risk (permanent component) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (world) -0.0107** -0.00849
(0.00470) (0.00677)
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (world; alt. defl.) -0.0199*** -0.0121**
(0.00559) (0.00421)
1-year lagged offshoring intensity (non-OECD) -0.0707*** -0.0322
(0.0222) (0.0189)
export-share in production -0.0383 -0.0378 -0.0371
(0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0233)
import penetration 0.0280 0.0288 0.0275
(0.0248) (0.0244) (0.0254)
RnD share in value added 0.000128 0.000110 9.39e-05
(0.000146) (0.000146) (0.000157)
laborshare 6.63e-05 0.000871 0.000451
(0.00576) (0.00537) (0.00594)
year fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 114 114 114 108 108 108
R-squared 0.085 0.133 0.126 0.332 0.344 0.334
Number of sector 19 19 19 18 18 18
Notes: Estimation is by fixed-effects. The coefficient values on the offshoring measures are to be
understood as follows: a one unit change in offshoring (= percentage point change) corresponds
to a βˆ/100 change in the variance of persistent changes in the unexplained component of income
(= permanent income risk). Sector 36 has incomplete data coverage which leads to a slightly
reduced number of observations in some cases. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8: Results for 5-year averages, 1991-2005, individually significant risk estimates
only
income risk (permanent component) 1 2 3 4 5 6
offshoring intensity (world) -0.187 -0.235***
(0.126) (0.0531)
offshoring intensity (world; alt. defl.) -0.180 -0.241***
(0.131) (0.0554)
offshoring intensity (non-OECD) -0.421*** -0.508**
(0.132) (0.217)
export-share in production 0.00805 0.00430 0.0658
(0.0581) (0.0585) (0.0545)
import penetration 0.00191 0.00820 -0.0600
(0.107) (0.107) (0.0960)
RnD share in value added -0.00194** -0.00208** -0.000936
(0.000896) (0.000901) (0.000966)
laborshare -0.0621 -0.0617 -0.0596
(0.0602) (0.0597) (0.0682)
time-period fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27
R-squared 0.338 0.330 0.240 0.611 0.615 0.525
Number of sectors 15 15 15 15 15 15
Notes: Estimation is by fixed-effects. The coefficient values on the offshoring measures are to be
understood as follows: a one unit change in offshoring (= percentage point change) corresponds
to a βˆ/100 change in the variance of persistent changes in the unexplained component of income
(= permanent income risk). Sector 36 has incomplete data coverage which leads to a slightly
reduced number of observations in some cases. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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